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TRADEMARK TROLLS: MISUSE OF TRADEMARK RIGHTS AND 
SIGNS LACKING DISTINCTIVE POWER - NOTES FROM THE 
FREE COMPETITION PERSPECTIVE 
João Marcelo de Lima Assafim 
I - Preamble 
The study of intellectual property roles is an important instrument for 
delimiting the holder’s powers.   It is a relevant element regarding the definition 
of the scope of the holder’s “legal power”, which, therefore, determines the 
dimension of the regular exercise of the right, and of what exceeds this exercise, 
characterizing the misuse.   
The regular exercise of a right is characterized by exclusive rights 
with two branches, i.e., the positive right to use (business branch) and the 
negative right to exclude third parties (or ius prohibendi).  In European law, it 
is described by the immaterial property (Imaterialgüterrecht) and competition 
theory, and in Anglo-Saxon Law, it is designated by the notion of exclusive 
rights.  Undoubtedly, such powers go beyond those that define the right born 
out of the institute of property (proprietas), built on possession, characterized 
by a positive right to use the material and corporeal property or thing (res), 
which is enough, by itself, to exclude third parties.   It is worth mentioning the 
discrepancy between the institutes called “property rights” and “propriedade” 
(the Portuguese word for proprietas), which are not synonyms.  
Firstly, intellectual property is an asset and, as such, it may be 
appropriated.  The appropriation upon property attribution must occur in each 
country, following the applicable provisions of each respective constitutional 
system.     
The regular exercise of intellectual property rights tends to work as 
cornerstone for development policies based on the induction of innovation, 
causing a pro-entrepreneur effect, and leading to more consistent economic 
growth levels than those seen in the commodities market with identical or 
homogeneous products.   However, the misuse of this regular exercise towards 
a situation of abuse, to the contrary, may cause an anti-entrepreneur effect, 
reducing innovation and harming the purposes of the development public 
policies.   In some national jurisdictions, some of these cases may be understood 
as exclusionary practices and ruled by the vertical restraints regime, while in 
others the abuse of the petitioning right may be considered “sham litigation” 
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(somehow alike the “sham” exception of the Noerr-Pennington immunity).    
Therefore, the situations of misuse tend to generate distortions to the free 
competition and must be fought by the institutions and institutes dedicated to 
social control and by the policy maker.  
In case of antitrust violations, the path walked by the conduct that 
restricts competition against the exercise of intellectual property rights crosses 
several stages.  Most of the conducts are private issues and solved by other 
fields of law: trade secrets, patent violation, unfair competition, etc.   
Nevertheless, some important competition restrictions may occur upon 
unilateral conducts (such as in cases of abuse of a dominant position1  - or 
market power -, without collusion or agreements among competitors), but may 
also occur upon horizontal (in the case of cartels and other agreements among 
competitors), and vertical agreements (e.g. technology transfer and franchise 
agreements, selective distribution agreements among agents located in different 
levels of the production scale).      In the first stage, the matter is always related 
to the delimitation of the relevant intellectual property right (industrial property 
or copyright, as applicable) itself: whether there is or not a protection and 
whether the exercise of the relevant right occurs out of this scope (which must 
always be construed restrictively; the hyperbolic interpretation of exclusive 
rights being illegal).     
Therefore, the misuse of right is the starting point of a relevant scale, 
which begins with private acts and agreements (exercise of right) and may reach 
the scope of the public interest along the production scale.   This hypothetical 
progression allows us to infer the existence of another kind of scale – something 
like a “distortion scale” -, which begins with the misuse (of right) itself, and 
advances towards the civil notion of undue enrichment (of the relevant agent), 
may go through losses to third parties, and ends on the scope of civil liability. 
Thus, if it causes losses to competitors (upon client poaching), it may also mean 
“unfair competition”.   But this scale does not stop at this point (made up of 
essentially private interests).   The illegal action may exceed the violation of 
private interests and finally affect, somehow, the public interest - notably 
consumers’ interests - upon increase of costs for consumer research or 
overpricing resulting from the inefficiency in resource allocation.     Therefore, 
if the client poaching - effectively or potentially - affects the market (whether 
by concentrating its structure, or regardless of that, imposing the loss - cost - to 
customers of the monopoly’s dead weight, or the socially unfair situation of 
                                                     
1 HERNÁNDEZ RODRIGUEZ, F. , Proibición de abuso de posición dominante en el 
mercado, in: BELLO MARTÍN-CRESPO, M.P.  e HERNÁNDEZ RODRIGUEZ, F. , 
Derecho de la Libre Competencia Comunitario y Español, Navarra, Aranzadi, 2009, p. 
113.   
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scarcity), the relevant abuse falls into the scope of competition laws, or simply 
into the antitrust legislation2.    
The question is: should the situations involving misuse of intellectual 
property rights (IPR) that restrict free competition be subject to the static 
analysis of price competition on price or to the analysis of dynamic competition 
in the technology and innovation markets?    In the second case, should the 
antitrust static analysis - over price - be used to justify the shelving of an 
investigation about the abusive exercise of intellectual property rights due to 
lack of evidence? 
Therefore, we can establish a “scale of distortions” that begin with 
the misuse of right, go through the undue enrichment, and may end within the 
competition violation.  
The competition law punishes holders of intellectual property rights 
that do not exploit, in a normal way, their exclusive rights and, therefore, cause 
a restriction to free competition3.   The antitrust cases of restrictions caused by 
the exercise of intellectual property rights are common in the USA and in the 
EU.  However, there are relatively few references4 to cases tried by the 
                                                     
2 FORGIONI, P. Os Fundamentos do Antitruste, 2ª Ed.,  São Paulo: Editora Revista 
dos Tribunais, 2005. GABAN, E.M. E DOMINGUES, J. O., Direito Antitruste, São 
Paulo: Saraiva, 2012.   
 
3 “Le droit de la concurrence sanctionne les titulaires de droits de propriété intectuelle 
qui n’exploitent pas normalment leur droit exclusif et qui provoquent ainsi une 
restriction de a concurrence. »  MARÉCHAL, Camile, Concurrence et propriété 
intellectuelle, Paris, Litec, 2009, pp. 85 e ss.  
Le droit de la concurrence sanctionne les titulaires de droits de propriété intectuelle qui 
n’exploitent pas normalment leur droit exclusif et qui provoquent ainsi une restriction 
de a concurrence. »  MARÉCHAL, Camile, Concurrence et propriété intellectuelle, 
Paris, Litec, 2009, pp. 85 e ss.  
4Until now, it is worth highlighting the Box 3 Vídeo case, which adjudged the party for 
abuse of petitioning right with anticompetitive effect.  In the administrative process nº 
08012.004283/2000-40, the plaintiff was the Commission for Protection of Consumers, 
the Environment and Minorities of the Chamber of Deputies, and the plaintiffs were 
Box 3 Vídeo e Publicidade Ltda. and Léo Produções e Publicidade.  Although the 
Economic Law Office (SDE) decided for the lack of evidence, the mandatory appeal 
was granted by the Board of CADE. The decision of the board was as follows: “The 
Board unanimously granted the mandatory appeal and ordered Box 3 Vídeo to pay a 
fine of one million seven hundred seventy-four thousand three hundred and twelve 
Reais and sixty-six cents (BLR1,774,312.66), and to publish the descriptive statement 
of the adverse judgement, as per the opinion of the Rapporteur Member, for violation 
of competition laws, pursuant to articles 20 and 21, IV and V, of Law nº 8,884/94. The 
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Brazilian Antitrust Authority (CADE) that can indicate a clear criterion for 
analyzing misuse of intellectual property rights.   Anyhow, the mere opening 
of an investigation (whether it is a preliminary investigation in accordance with 
the legislation in force at the time, or an administrative investigation – inquérito 
administrativo, i.e., an administrative procedure – processo administrativo) of 
cases that examined the exercise of intellectual property rights, instead of the 
discretionary shelving that happened in other times (by a single policy maker 
and before the evidentiary stage), demonstrates a change of attitude of the 
authority in charge of enforcing competition rules.  
II - Intellectual property roles  
Intellectual property roles are mainly based on social and economic 
aspects.  Many authors seek, using this path, to justify granting exclusive rights 
to the holder.  More than that, the literature points out that authors go beyond 
the mere intent  - or an academic exercise - in that sens0e, and uses the roles 
(função) as instruments to support court decisions when making the title and 
the exercise of “exclusive rights” compatible with principles that protect public 
interests, such as free circulation of goods in the EU5, or the notion of free 
enterprise in Brazil.     However, they also have a political content guided by a 
philosophical vector that is nothing more than the consumers’ and the society’s 
welfare; such political content being denied by part of the Anglo-Saxon 
literature.  Therefore, the public interest is subject to social control and at this 
point, it agrees with other subjects, such as the Competition Law.  
Therefore, although IPRs are private rights, and as so IPRs are strictly 
limited in order to ensure their - regular or abusive - exercise do not generate, 
against society, an adverse effect that is inconsistent with the intellectual 
property rights’ roles, i.e., the right’s features that enable the identification of 
roles used to induce economic activity and growth, offer increase, consumer 
welfare, freedom to do business, employment increase and, finally, 
development.       Finally, the protection is not meant to protect the fame of 
trademarks or the investment itself, but their pro-entrepreneur effect.  
Therefore, all anti-entrepreneur effects deriving from distortions in the exercise 
                                                     
sentence shall be executed within thirty (30) days. It has also been ordered that SDE 
initiates an administrative procedure, according to the suggestions presented by the 
Federal Prosecution Office and by PROCADE (Specialized Prosecution Office acting 
with CADE) in order to assess if other individuals or legal entities (such as Luiz Galebe, 
Leo Produções, Shop Tour Internacional, etc.) have also committed these acts.” 
5 FERNÁNDEZ-NOVOA, C., Tratado sobre Derecho de Marcas, Marcial Pons, 
Madrid, 2004, page 67.   
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of such rights must be fought using the proper social control tools.  
Notwithstanding that, it could be said that the public and private law 
areas related with competition are not antagonistic6.   On the contrary, both the 
rules governing loyalty in competition and governing intellectual property 
rights in general on one hand, and the rules governing free competition on the 
other hand, have the purpose of increasing dynamic competition, encouraging 
the economic activity with all its pro-entrepreneur effect.    Considering this 
premise, the restrictive exercise of such powers - causing an anti-entrepreneur 
effect - must be understood as a deviation from the role and, therefore, a 
dysfunction. 
The analysis above is fundamental for distinguishing the regular 
exercise situations from those of abusive exercise of intellectual property rights.  
The first step of this work is delimiting the powers granted by the Law to each 
category of IPR, each type of exclusive right, and from the delimitation of the 
legal scopes, we must determine which situations lead to the regular exercise 
of the right.   
In that sense, from the delimitation of powers of the rights’ holders, 
the acts exceeding such scope will lead, to the contrary, to the deviation of the 
intellectual property’s role or to misuse of right (see, for example, the misuse 
doctrine7).    
III - Trademark’s roles   
Trademark’s roles, as the other IPR’S roles, are built on the 
                                                     
6Regardless of the relevant notes about obscure points of this interaction that, for some 
jurists, may be conflictive, even today. FIALA, Donatella, Das Verhältnis zwichen 
Immaterialgüter- und Kartellrecht, Bern, Stämpfli, 2006, pp.1-3.  „Das verhältnis 
zwischen dem Immaterialgüterrecht und dem Kartellrecht ist konfliktträchtig.“ 
Das Verhältnis zwischen Immaterialgüter- und Kartellrecht:  unter dem Blickwinkel 
des Missbrauchs einer marktbeherrschenden Stellung sowie der Entiwicklungen im 
Bereich der Genpatente, Bern, Stämpf Verlag, 2006, pp. 2 e ss.  Para esta autora, em 
contraste com a concepção estadounidense,  „Das verhältnis zwischen dem 
Immaterialgüterrecht und dem Kartellrecht ist konfliktträchtig.“ 
7 WEBB, J.M. e LOCKE, L., Intellectual Property Misuse: Developments in the Misuse 
Doctrine, Havard Journal of Law and Technology, vol. 4,  1991, p. 257.  “The doctrine 
of intellectual property misuse has its origins in the patent misuse doctrine. ent misuse 
is an affirmative defense to a suit for patent infringement or for royalties due under a 
patent licensing agreement.  The doctrine developed and matured prior to the 
development of any significant body of federal antitrust law, as a judicial response to 
perceived anticompetitive practices of patent owners.” 
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foundations of a social and economic analysis.  
For a long time, trademark’s roles were not a concern of jurists of the 
European Continental Law8, nor of the systems that adopt the Romano-
Germanic civil conception.  Common law, on the contrary, when using its rule 
of reason, ends up using the economic analysis as a part of legal interpretation. 
The study of trademark’s roles is a long task, and this work does not 
intend to analyze all aspects of this matter.  However, we acknowledge that 
trademark’s roles are a valuable instrument for interpreting rules that delimit 
the holder’s powers. 
There are several studies about trademark’s social and economic 
roles, notably in the EU, after the examination of cases by the CJEU (Court of 
Justice of the European Union) under article 85.1 of TEC (Treaty of the 
European Communities) (which later became article 81.1, and currently had its 
number changed to article 101.19), which are necessary to make the exercise of 
IPR compatible with the principle of free circulation of goods10.    In the US, 
the creation, in 1982, of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, with 
exclusive jurisdiction for patent cases - a species that is a reference to the genus 
(industrial property) -, had a particular meaning for the jurisdictional policy.   
The purpose of studying the trademark’s roles is the economic 
analysis of the exercise of rights starting from the delimitation of the relevant 
powers (legal power scope) that are part of the exercise of such intellectual 
property rights (IPRs), and finally, the public domain dimension.   Therefore, 
we initially ask about (1) the scope of enforcement of exclusive rights and, in 
their absence (whether due to their expiration, or due to the choice of the holder 
of controller of the immaterial “property” for the non-protection by 
exclusivity), whether for the incidence of (intrinsic or extrinsic) limits of IPRs, 
                                                     
8 « Antes de exponer las funciones de la marca, parece oportuno aludir al importante 
papel que la marca desenpeña en la esfera económica.  La importancia de este papel ha 
sido acerdadamente subrayada por el Memorandum que sobre la creación de una marca 
comunitaria publicó en 1976  la Comisión de las Comunidades Europeas.  En este 
documento se resalta de manera expresiva el papel informativo que la marca debe 
cumplir en el seno del Mercado Común. (…) En el Memorandum se mantiene a ese 
respecto la tesis de que la marca es precisamente el mecanismo que hace posible la 
identificación y subsiguiente selección de los productos.  Y se llega a la conclusión de 
que la marca es el único medio que por permitir elegir los productos a través  de su 
identificación, hace posible que la oferta  de productos de una misma clase sea 
transparente para el consumidor.  FERNÁNDEZ-NOVOA, C.,  Tratado sobre Derecho 
de Marcas, Marcial Pons, Madrid, 2004, p. 66.   
9 RIβMANN, Karin, Die kartellrechtliche Berurteilung der Markenabgrenzung, München, Herbert Utz 
Verlag, 2008, pp. 28-39. 
10 Ibidem. 
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(2) the delimitation of the scope of the provisions against unfair 
competition.   Finally, from such limits, we can infer, based on the powers of 
the IPR’s holder, the dimension of the freedom of enterprise of the other 
competitors and participants, and thus we can gather the essential elements for 
fighting misuses (protection of essentially private interests), and notably those 
with anti-competitive effects (protection of essentially public interests).    In 
this last aspect, the social control will occur upon enforcement of antitrust rules.   
In that sense, it is important that the relevant authorities do not refrain 
themselves from examining cases presented to them, i.e., that they analyze on 
the merits of the case and render an adverse judgement, or decide for shelving 
the case, but in this lase case, they should define the criteria and requirements 
(notably indicating that the “test” stage has not been overcome).  Firstly, in 
trademark law, the purpose of a competitive operation of the market is through 
the validity conditions or legal requirements, the extension of protection and 
the obligation to exploit11  locally the IPR.    
IV - Requirements for obtaining the right 
Intellectual property is a legal regime established for immaterial 
property legally susceptible to a special protection granted by a certain 
jurisdiction (automatic - declaratory on one hand, or upon registration - 
public-attributive -, on the other hand, as applicable), in accordance with the 
provisions of copyrights law (declaratory system) and of the industrial 
property (attributive system)   
From the expression “special protection” we do not infer an automatic 
protection to all (or several) national systems, but a protection upon grant of 
exclusive rights limited by the territory.     This category encompasses certain 
realities that are products of men’s intellectual creation, being susceptible to 
exterior manifestation and that can be monopolized12 somehow.   It is a right 
that characterizes, for example, the main element that enables e-businesses, 
which the antitrust literature calls “new economy” 13, and is built on the 
                                                     
11 En droit des marques, l’objectif de fonctionnement concurrentiel des marché  est 
présent  au travers des conditions de validité (A),  de l’étendue de la protection (B), et 
de l’obligation d’exploiter le signe (C).  MARÉCCHAL C.,  Concurrence et Propriété 
Intellectuelle, Litec, Paris, 2009, pp. 273 e ss.  
12 KOHLER, J., Deutches Patentrecht, Mannheim-Strasbourg, 1878. GÓMEZ 
SEGADE, J.A., El secreto industrial (know-how): concepto y protección, Madrid, 
1978. 
13 POSNER, R., Antitrust Law. 2nd Ed., Chicago / London, Univ. Chicago Press,2001, 
pp. 408 e ss. 
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intellectual property rights.     Trademark, as a species of the genus industrial 
property (rights) is a right whose formation is subject to the attributive regime14, 
thus depending on a grant act by the government (administrative act) in each 
jurisdiction of interest.    
Initially, the first requirement is the distinctive character15 (it must 
distinguish the species without designating the genus).   Otherwise, the irregular 
appropriation of public domain would be possible.  It would indeed be a 
dysfunction of the trademark system.  
Since trademark protection fundamentally depends on the 
distinctiveness (or distinctive character) of the relevant sign, the analysis of 
misuse cases begins here.  At the same time, the visual perception requirement 
(a sign that can be visually perceived - optional requirement for national 
jurisdiction under TRIPS), and the territorial limitation of the rights that grant 
right to the first application filed locally deserve attention.   Therefore, the 
property attribution requirements comply with three principles, as follows: (1) 
priority; (2) specialty; and (3) territoriality. 
Civil law’s attributive system is built on the first to file principle.   
Regarding this principle, the birth of a right to a trademark occurs (it emerges 
on the surface of the “legal reality”) with the filing of the sign before the 
relevant authority, in the territory of the respective jurisdiction (country), 
regardless of this sign having been used prior to the registration by the holder 
                                                     
14 Law nº 9,279 of May 14, 1996 (Brazilian Law of Intellectual Property - LPI) sets 
forth that: Article 129. The property of a mark is acquired by means of registration, 
when validly granted pursuant to the provisions of this Law, and its exclusive use 
throughout the national territory is assured to the titleholder, with due regard, as to 
collective and certification marks, to the provision in Articles 147 and 148.  
Paragraph 1. Every person who, in good faith on the priority or filing date, has been 
using an identical or similar mark in this country for at least 6 (six) months to 
distinguish or certify an identical, similar or alike product or service shall have the right 
of preference for the registration  
Paragraph 2. The right of preference may only be assigned together with the business 
of the company, or part thereof, that has a direct relation with the use of the mark, by 
transfer or leasing. 
15 “L’article L. 711-2 du Code de la propriété intellectuelle interdit de choisir une 
marque composée exlusivement de signes ou de dénominations  ‘pouvant servir à 
designer une caractéristique du produit ou du service, et notamment  l’espèce, la qualité, 
la quantité, la destination la valeur, laprovenane géographique, l’epoque de la 
production du bien ou dela pretation de sevice ’.  Non seulement ces signes ne sont pas 
propres à exerer la fonction de marque, mais ils doivent rester à disposition de tous les 
opérateur du marché”.  MARÉCHAL C., MARÉCHAL, Camile, Concurrence et 
propriété intellectuelle, Paris, Litec, 2009, pp. 273 and 274.  
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in the market where the protection is requested16.     
Upon public registration, the holder obtains, in addition to the positive 
right to use, the negative right to exclude third parties.   This negative right, or 
ius prohibendi, is also known as an exclusionary right that may be enforced by 
the holder to exclude or prevent competitors’ products and services from 
entering the market.  The exclusion may occur provided that such products or 
services (class of activity) are equal or similar (specialty principle), can replace 
each other, have identical trademark signs, or similar to those protected by the 
exclusionary right.    The trademark classification delimits the protection as a 
corollary of free enterprise and free competition.  It is not an absolute domain 
over any and all uses of the sign.  On the contrary, such right is not binding 
upon the use of products and services that cannot replace the protected products 
or services.    From the economic point of view, products whose ‘crossed 
relation of demand is inelastic’ are not substitutes, i.e., there is no risk of 
consumers (or purchasers) being confused, nor of client poaching.  This is the 
reason the specialty principle exists.    
Accordingly, free competition is the grounds for the restriction of 
legal powers granted to a holder of trademark right, since the right does not - 
and could not - grant a legal monopoly over a sign to a holder that is not 
interested in entrepreneurship.    Otherwise, the holders’ interests would lie 
more on the violation (since the income would derive from violations and 
damages derived from lawsuits) or disturbance of efficient competitors’ rights 
than on the freedom of enterprise (working as true “trademark trolls”).    
Then, two different products (and/or services) destined to different 
audiences, for trademark protection purposes, tend to be separated by the 
products and services classification and, therefore, may present similar - or even 
identical - distinctive signs as trademarks.   Both will peacefully coexist in the 
market.   This occurs, for example, with the dainties “Biscoito Globo” and the 
TV broadcaster “TV Globo”, both from the State of Rio de Janeiro.    Both 
trademarks coexist in the Brazilian market without any risk of client poaching.  
The protection scope is territorial.  Therefore, the exclusionary right 
granted by a State to its nationals or domiciled persons is restricted to its own 
territory.   Notwithstanding that, there is the national treatment granted to 
                                                     
16There are only three exception to the priority principle: 1) the unionist priority (term 
of six months counted from the claimed priority, as of the filing of the trademark 
application in another Member-State of the Paris Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property); 2) well-known trademarks (which, less than a trademark, is merely 
a standing to sue offered to the user without registration); and (3) the well-known 
trademark (for acknowledgement of a fact binding upon third parties within the 
protected market, in a customs union or in a reciprocity regime among countries).  
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foreigners domiciled in the territory where the protection is sought (see article 
4 of Law nº 9,279 of May 1417, 1996 (Brazilian Industrial Property Law - LPI).   
The national legislation equates the domiciled foreigner to the national, but it 
does not do so regarding the non-domiciled person.  The reason is that the latter 
(non-domiciled foreigners) are not subject to the same formalities as the 
nationals.  
Therefore, the protection to rights of non-nationals coming from 
states that are members of the Paris Convention could not create a 
discrimination in favor of non-domiciled persons, to the loss of nationals and 
domiciled foreigners;   Accordingly, article 2 of the Paris Convention for the 
International Protection of Industrial Property, which states that (1) Nationals 
of any country of the Union shall, as regards the protection of industrial 
property, enjoy in all the other countries of the Union the advantages that their 
respective laws now grant, or may hereafter grant, to nationals; all without 
prejudice to the rights specially provided for by this Convention. Consequently, 
they shall have the same protection as the latter, and the same legal remedy 
against any infringement of their rights, provided that the conditions and 
formalities imposed upon nationals are complied with.  Accordingly, the 
national of a Member State of the Convention who is domiciled in Brazil has 
the same rights as a national, provided that all the same formalities applicable 
to them are met. Therefore, the non-domiciled non-national is out of the scope 
of this rule, without generating any benefit.  
 Thus, this is an extraordinary “legal power”, since it allows its holder 
to impose to a third party the abstention of use, preventing competition by 
imitation, even if it the intervention in someone else’s property is necessary.   
This negative right of exclusion, inherent to the immaterial property, exceeds 
the positive right to use exercised by the possession of the thing (or res) over 
the ownership interest in “corporal material property.”       This power, when 
regularly exercised, is the basis of the “new economy” (of technological basis 
and related to the information society).  Intellectual property rights - IPR have 
a major role in development policies based on innovation.   
Thus, the negative right of exclusion (ius prohibendi) allows the 
creation of consume rivalry and, with that, provides means for the right’s holder 
to add value to their business methods using the relevant immaterial property.    
New business opportunities arise from that.   
Therefore, for example, a small “inventor” of a “revolutionary” 
computer system (an application, an invention implemented by a computer 
                                                     
17Article 4 of LPI states that: Article 4. The provisions of treaties in force in Brazil are 
equally applicable to individuals and legal entities who are nationals of or domiciled 
in this country. 
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software, etc.) may create a new market and/or do business with already-
stablished companies, and even “destroy” well-stablished old markets.      This 
right is what ends up generating a pro-entrepreneur effect, and on the tip of the 
innovation process, the dynamic competition.    However, if exercised with 
abuse (misuse), such exclusionary right (that integrates the IPRs) may also 
subject the other competitors to an increase of cost and, at the same time, may 
subject consumers to unjustified levels of structural concentration of the market 
and to the dead weight of monopoly.18 
If, on one hand, the scarce intellectual property and the abundant 
competition damage the incentive to the intended pro-entrepreneur effect, on 
the other hand the abundant intellectual property and the scarce competition 
tend to produce a disastrous anti-competitive effect.  This last case can be a 
result of a reckless “political choice” (and legislative), or of a situation of 
misuse of right (carried out by private entities).   Let us see a brief introduction 
to the characterization of misuse of IPRs.  
V - Misuse of right  
The misuse of rights occurs when their holder exercises the right 
beyond the limits of faculties (its powers), which are confined by the scope of 
the “legal power”.  The interpretation of rules governing the scope of 
intellectual property rights must be restrictive, with the prohibition of 
hyperbolic interpretation, since it would artificially restrict third parties’ 
freedom of enterprise and, eventually, the free competition19.   The misuse of 
rights situations, specifically intellectual property rights – IPRs -, may be used 
by the agent with the purpose of excluding an efficient competitor20.     
In Brazilian Law, the misuse of right is originated from the civil law, 
and is set forth in articles 186 and 187 of the Civil Code of 2002.  The notion 
is a broad category of practices carried out by a certain agent with acts 
performed beyond the faculties that are comprised in the scope of “legal 
power”.   As an example of this distortion, we mention the misuse of powers 
by the exercise of said rights, such as the misuse of the ius prohibendi, i.e., the 
misuse that intends to exclude efficient competitors through an artificial way.   
In other words, considering the “problem”, for e.g., from the point of view of 
the so-called “new economy”, a competitor can use intellectual property for this 
                                                     
18 POSNER, Antitrust Law, page 22 et. seq.  
19This situation, i.e., the restriction of powers comprised in the freedom of enterprise, 
violates article 170 of Brazil’s Constitution, where it is called free enterprise (livre 
iniciativa or liberdade de empreender). 
20 POSNER, Antitrust…, op. cit., page 424.  
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purpose in the same way that, in a traditional business (involving commodities, 
for example), a monopolist can use an exclusivity clause or a predatory conduct 
(whether by price, publicity or innovation) in order to create a barrier to entry 
or an exclusionary vector with the purpose of banishing efficient competitors.   
The investment of an IPR holder in the attempt to exclude the user of a sign, 
invention or copyright that is in the public domain.  
Notwithstanding that, the structural conditions tend to require proof 
of the market power (which can be differentiated from monopoly power) in 
exclusionary practices.   As the IPR is a right obtained with fraud or that does 
not exist such a proof may be dismissed (vide the Box 3 Video case).    
For example, these categories of practices may occur upon exclusion 
acts performed based on an apparent exclusionary right but that, in fact, in light 
of the technical strictness, are more than so: a non-right.    The purpose of the 
exclusion agent may be obtaining extraordinary gains that range from income 
with royalties resulting from licensing, through damages awarded in a lawsuit, 
to the creation of an inefficient barrier to entry serving the monopoly price 
without collusion (or agreement among companies).        
A conduct like this can be performed by a certain holder of IPRs 
(positive right to use) - constituted or obtained - over immaterial objects of 
common use (invention in the state-of-the-art, signs without distinctive 
character, etc.), that integrate the public domain - if said person tries to use the 
positive right to use as a negative right to exclude of competitors.    We can 
mention, among other exclusionary practices, the attempt to appropriate names 
registered in dictionaries, without distinctive character, for the relevant product 
or designated service.   A common use sign, the generic can be characterized as 
such in a more specific situation, common use signs or vulgarized by the 
previous use by effective competitors in the same market.       A situation of 
distortion may occur when a player appropriates the generic name associated 
with a trademark in order to file abstention actions against rivals.   Another case 
of distortion occurs when there is the combination of signs with other categories 
of IPRs, such as a patent application for an old an already known solution (or a 
generic name), that is, as a matter of fact, an evergreen application, are used to 
raise rival’s cost. 
Here, we are not dealing with the levels of distinctive power of the 
signs.   Our attention is focused on the generic signs (which describe the product 
itself - for e.g., the trademark “water” for a specific mineral water), and 
descriptive signs (which describe characteristics of the product, such as the 
word “diet” as a trademark for a diet beverage).     A common use sign (without 
distinctive power) not only tends to have been used before by competitors, but 
also may have been subject to some level of prior protection (even if only to 
ensure positive rights to use).    In this context, another category of misuse of 
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right commonly occurs within the industrial property area when the agent files 
the application for a trademark involving a sign that has already been protected, 
appropriated or used by competitors somehow, with the purpose of excluding 
the previous user (an equally or more efficient competitor) by the applicant 
(whether monopolist or not).     
In this case, this kind of conducts that, as seen before, may also occur 
due to the common use (public domain) has three relevant aggravating 
circumstances: (1) being the result of an irregular intention of appropriation, 
whose basis is not recovering a legitimate investment in R&D or in marketing 
over the distinctive sign; (2) carrying out the intent of excluding the legal and 
previous use and/or subtracting rights from competitors; (3) the purpose of 
obtaining an extraordinary competitive advantage by monopolizing the 
reference known by the consumers and purchasers, and increasing the rival’s 
costs.   The combination of these factors will cause serious disturbances to the 
competitors.     
Competition distortion situations may derive from misuse of the 
jurisdiction tools made up by legal actions provided to exclude (and, in addition 
to the abstention of use imposition, penalties for late penalties, damages 
calculated over the license analogy, and the controversial “damage for 
emotional distress”), and also attempts to generate income from the use by 
competitors, upon imposition of licenses (after extrajudicial notices during the 
course of the legal actions, or due to a “reputation” of being belligerent), it 
being certain that both situations tend to create “negative externalities”).    
Punitive damages are still not embraced by Brazilian precedents.  
A natural reaction of competitors who are victims of monopoly is the 
affirmative defense (an antitrust suit or/and  a injunction suit based on a 
judicial nullity declaration of the IPR title).      As a rebut, it has been common 
in cases, the justification used by the defendant  (pointed as a monopolizing 
agent - or the one committing the abusive exclusionary act21) is the investment 
on the sign used as a trademark22.     That is, the economic agent tends to justify 
their attempt to appropriate a sign without distinctive character (descriptive or 
generic) due to the commercial investment on the sign (advertising, for 
example), which, by itself, would justify the exclusion of competitors.    
However, the plaintiff may consider the roll of the industrial property law to 
                                                     
21In responses to affirmative defenses, both in lawsuits for declaration of total or partial 
voidness against irregular or badly-limited protection, and in antitrust representations 
for unilateral conduct. 
22Normally presented to the administrative authority upon request of interested third 
parties.  The procedural law ground is the Federal Administrative Process Law - Law 
nº 9,784, of January 29, 1999.    
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argue that IP does not protect the reputation itself, nor the means used to achieve 
it.    On the contrary, legislations that list, among the trademark’s roles, the 
protection of advertising investments, do not protect the investment and the 
reputation by themselves to the point of deserving an exclusionary right.   
The protection is granted, thus, to the investment made in the 
enterprise of an efficient player. Therefore, the respective positive externality 
of such a business is the so called “pro-entrepreneur effect.”   
The investment is only legal if made in a legal object (thing or res).    
Therefore, this phenomenon (which, for the purpose of this work, is called 
“cornering”) is seen especially when the investment is made in something 
illegal, rather than in a legal thing23.  In this case, the investment itself does not 
justify any kind of protection.  On the contrary, allowing this would be like in 
situation of repossession, admitting justifications for the invasion, criminal 
trespass or disturbance, with the investment in improvements being made by 
the invader after the illegal occupation of the property.   Cornering can involve 
private or public property24.   As an example of public property, there are all 
immaterial property forming the public domain: whether it is a sign without 
distinctive power, or an invention in the state-of-the-art.   
In case of a sign lacking distinctive power (whether it is generic or 
descriptive), the use is legal, common to all competitors, and useful to 
consumers during their market researches that are prior to and guide their 
respective purchase decisions.  However, on the contrary, attempting to 
appropriate a common property, i.e., the nominative sign used by the language 
to describe the product to be sold, or the sign with a figurative presentation that 
describes the characteristic or image of the relevant product would be illegal.     
If a situation of extravagant attempt of appropriation (economically unjustified, 
inefficient) by an economic agent (cornering), to the loss of the other 
competitors (equally or more efficient) is accepted by the Government (the 
Brazilian Patent and Trademark Office, for e.g.) without reservations or use 
                                                     
23It may happen in the case of an appropriation attempt, by the applicant of a trademark 
application, of a generic sign that cannot be appropriated, for e.g., by the secondary 
meaning.   If the trademark application made by applicant is baseless for being generic 
or it is descriptive, but already used by competitors before de application filed or the 
applicant’s use and somehow protected in this way by these competitors,  the 
exclusionary practice of a competitor on this ground may be a case of bad faith. 
24The attempt of cornering immaterial property in public domain is the same as the 
attempt to appropriate a source of inputs, which brings the phenomenon closer to the 
antitrust theory of essential facilities.   In this aspect, there is point of contact with an 
important phenomenon regarding the industrial protection of background knowledge, 
such as the matter of “pattern” patents. 
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restrictions, this property attribution will probably lead to the use of the IPRs 
as an instrument serving an exclusionary conduct and, as a consequence, to the 
increase of costs of the consumers’ choice.     
Thus, the descriptive nominative sign presents a public interest, is 
used to designate characteristics of a certain market, a category of products or 
services (and not the product of a specific manufacturer), is associated with the 
respective trademarks of several manufacturers having an informative role 
regarding the relevant product or service, and has the purpose of helping 
consumers exercise their right to choose, since it reduces the consume research 
costs.25   This sign cannot be appropriated by a competitor to the loss of the 
others.   
If this sign lacking distinctive power (descriptive or generic) was 
appropriated by a competitor, to the loss of the others, it would make consumers 
confuse instead of distinguishing products or services of a market.    For 
example, in the point of sale, the seller would not know if the client is looking 
for the category of the species, and the same thing would happen to new 
consumers, who would be confused and unable to distinguish one thing from 
the other.     
For example, how could a consumer from Rio de Janeiro, when 
arriving in another state, distinguish a “Ice Cream Cake” (which, in a 
hypothetical situation, is an ice cream cake trademark) from other ice cream 
cakes?  This would certainly be a difficult task.   If, on one hand, the local 
consumer might consider the product in their mind as first designation, the 
situation is different in the relevant national market.         
Therefore, a consumer coming from another state, for example, would 
not be able to decipher the information from the descriptive word the same way.   
It is quite likely that this supplier’s choice to use a descriptive sign will lead to 
an increase of the costs of choice for consumers26, who will not be able to 
identify the other competitors that easily.  On the contrary, consumers will be 
confused regarding the genus and the species.      
If this situation (confusion caused by the appropriation of generic and 
descriptive signs by a competitor) is confirmed, it may lead or at least 
collaborate to the creation of an impact vector in the structure of the relevant 
market, without having immediate influence over the price, but creating a 
concentration in cases the appropriation of the generic word works as a barrier 
                                                     
25 As indicated before, the common use by competitors, in a certain relevant market, of 
descriptive and generic signs, helps consumers make a purchase decision with 
independency and find the goods they are looking for. 
26 Costs of consumption research. 
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to entry or as a vector to the increase of rival’s costs.  It is so because the other 
competitors, subjugated, must create new expressions to describe their products 
(such as, for e.g., “sweet delicacy made with flour and eggs, and served in low 
temperature” or “cold dessert”), especially bearing the cost of ‘teaching” 
consumers about the respective meanings of the new  generic and descriptive 
words.   In this last case, the increase of rivals’ costs may occur in two other 
ways, notably upon licensing and “judicialization”, or due to the need of a high 
marketing investment to promote the new standard word.    
The priority, specialty, territoriality and distinctive character 
requirements arise from there.  These core commands, which are undoubtedly 
fundamental for the desirable maintenance of the legal certainty of the industrial 
property system, were smartly instituted by legislators of all countries forming 
the international system (created by the Paris Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property, of 1883, and reinforced by the approval of GATT-TRIPS 
in December, 1994), which have also been confirmed by the Brazilian and 
foreign scholars. It is worth stressing the relevance of the first to file principle 
(attributive system, or first registration) in Section A.1, article 4, of the Paris 
Convention, to the regular right to industrial property.27 
 
VI - Bad faith: non-right as a form of misuse 
The characterization of bad faith is still controversial.  However, it is 
a well-known phenomenon to the business law scholars, observed in other 
subjects of the same area, such as regarding negotiable instruments in the 
Geneva Uniform Law, the Uniform Benelux Law on Trademarks (Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Luxembourg), and in both cases the characterization of bad 
faith is subject to the same criteria and requirements.  Therefore, bad faith is: 
knowledge about a binding fact.   
Since bad faith accusations require parsimony and technical 
strictness, we sought help from the work (tesis doctoral) of the Spanish 
professor28  FRAMIÑAN SANTAS.  Said author, defining bad faith as a 
                                                     
27 BODEHAUSEN, G.H.F., Guia para la aplicación del Convenio de Paris para la 
protección internacional de la Propiedad Industrial, Revisado en Estocolmo 1967, 
Généve, BIRPI, 1969, p. 38. 
28 FRAMIÑAN SANTAS, J. La nulidad de marca solicitada de mala Fe: estúdio del 
artículo 51.1.b) de la Ley 17/2001, de 7 de diciembre, de marcas, Granada, Editorial 
Comares, 2007, p. 18. 
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dishonest intention, recovers the first precedent from a case tried under 
Reglamento (CE)número 40/1994 del Consejo (RMC), in the scope of 
community trademark, making the following considerations. 
“El primer caso del que tenemos Constancia atinente al término mala fe 
del art. 51.1b) del RMC es el llamado caso Trillium.  En este 
procedimiento, cuya lengua de tramitación era el inglés, la mala fe fue 
definida por la Primera División de Anulación del siguiente modo: 
  ‘Bad faith is a narrow legal concept in the CTMR system. Bad 
faith is the opposite of good faith, generally implying or involving, but 
not limited to, actual or constructive fraud, or a design to mislead or 
deceive another, or any other sinister motive.  Conceptually, bad faith 
can be understood as a “dishonest intention”.  This means that had faith 
may be interpreted as unfair practices involving lack of any honest 
intention on the part of the applicant of the CTM at the time of the 
filing.’”   (v. FRAMIÑAN SANTAS, cit, p. 18) 
 
Continuing, the Professor, is his PhD thesis, sheds a light on the 
immediately subsequent decision (after the first precedent considered): the 
“Senso Di Dona” case, based on the concept created in the “Trilium” case, using 
a new example for the hard task of connecting the fact to the legal provision. 
Let us see: 
“Example: If it can be shown that the parties concerned had been in 
contact, for instance at an exhibition in the respective trade, and where 
then one party filed an application for a CTM consisting of a containing 
the other party’s brand, there would be reason to conclude bad faith” 
Therefore, if there is evidence that an implicated or involved party 
has had access to the other party’s trademark, for example, in the exhibition 
deriving from the respective trade (of course, in the same national or 
community competition system, we cannot presume knowledge where there are 
no exchange or direct competition relations), and afterwards said party files a 
trademark application including the first party’s sign, we can deduce the bad 
faith.  In a real case, for example, the element evidencing the “knowledge” 
about the other party’s trademark, would be, in principle, the impeditive 
priority within the same national (or community,29if applicable) system, 
proven by the official publication of the Industrial Property Journal.  This 
                                                     
29Or unitary competition system of a Customs Union, in which there is a supra-national 
industrial property system replacing the national system of the Member States, even if 
the interaction between both is admitted, as it happens with the community trademark 
OHIM (Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market). 
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evidence can be confirmed by acts of the first party after the filing. 
Finally, bringing back the BE NATURAL case, the Iberic scholar 
says:  
“La OAMI continúa con la tarea de definir el concepto de mala fe em el 
caso BE natural. La Primera División de Anulación repite em la 
resolución de este caso la doctrina del caso Trilium. Pero la completa de 
siguiente modo:  
‘Bad faith can be understood either as unfair practices involving lack of 
good faith on the part of the applicant towards the Office at the time of 
the filing, or unfair practices base or acts infringing a third person’s 
rights. There is bad faith not only in cases where the applicant 
intentionally submits wrong os misleadingly insufficient information 
to the Office, but  also in circumstances where he intends, through 
registration, to lay his hands on the trade mark  of a third party with 
whom he had contractual o pre-contractual relations’  ” (no highlights in 
the original text)  
It is clear, then, that bad faith is characterized as acts that violate third 
parties’ rights, such as the knowledge about a binding fact that is intentionally 
hidden from the relevant authority (whether the INPI, or the Judiciary Branch), 
but also as the circumstances that allow the agent in bad faith to “put their 
hands” on third parties’ trademarks.  The decision above mentions the 
contractual relationships because they replace other evidence of the 
“knowledge” by the agent in bad faith, even in different competition system, as 
per the Uniform Benelux Law on Trademarks.  
Therefore, the bad faith is clear when the agent tries to file a 
trademark application encompassing a competitor’s trademark and, afterwards, 
tries to use a legal action to exclude this same competitor that used the prior 
registration as if they were a wrongdoer, intentionally hiding from the relevant 
authorities the legal position (proprietary right) of this person. 
In this cases, the control exercised by economic competition rules can 
be observed in the extrinsic limits of the industrial property. Antitrust, as a 
subject of free competition, defines the bad faith with anticompetition effects 
with the expression “sham litigation”. Let us see MICHAEL J. MEURER’S 
opinion. 
Socially harmful IP litigation is common because the rights are easy to 
get and potentially apply quite broadly, and the problem is growing 
worse because of the expansion of the scope and strength of IP Law(...)    
Antitrust law provides a potentially powerful means of controlling 
socially harmful IP litigation.186 Certain anti-competitive litigation 
violates Section 2 of the Sherman Act187 under two related theories.188 
One theory originated in Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food 
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Machinery & Chemical Corp.189 and applies only to patent infringement 
suits. The antitrust claimant must show that the patentee got its patent by 
committing common law fraud on the PTO, and that the patent would not 
have issued but for the fraud.190 The other theory applies to sham 
litigation, including sham IP litigation,191 and is based on a 
[*PG539]showing that the antitrust defendant (IP plaintiff) knew that 
objectively there was no basis for the infringement claim.192 Under 
either theory, the antitrust plaintiff must prove it suffered an antitrust 
injury, and must also show that the IP litigation created or sustained a 
monopoly in the relevant market.193 
Therefore, there is competition bad faith when the agent in bad faith 
files a lawsuit to exclude competitors, even knowing that their industrial 
property title does not grant them powers to obtain the exclusion, but for several 
factors (cost of the action, time required to overrule decisions, reinforcement of 
the belligerent “reputation, etc.), they do so due to the barrier to entry or the 
competitive advantage they may achieve against a competitor (efficient, in 
principle), even if temporarily.    
VII - Undue enrichment 
Undue enrichment in the civil law occurs when a player (individual 
or legal entity) has some profit that they should not have, in accordance with 
the loyal trade practices.   In trade, this practice tends to be associated with a 
gain related to the attracting clients, taking parasite-like advantage of someone 
else’s investment (a free ride), and may actually be related to unfair competition 
practices (but it is not restricted to exclusively competition-related relations, 
e.g., it may happen by subtracting a point of sale or the respective property 
value due to an unbalanced vertical agreement).   This is the first stage in the 
scale of distortions that may lead to competition restraints, whether upon illegal 
exercise, or violation of rights. 
The phenomena related to the violation of IPR, as those related to the 
misuse of IPR (exercise of rights) may cause both situations.   In cases of 
violation of intellectual property rights, for example, the undue enrichment of 
the agent of the conduct may lead to a reflex damage projected onto the victim’s 
property or income.  In this case, the civil liability is applicable in order to 
compensate for the loss.   Accordingly, if both sides of the coin are connected 
by a distortion in the private competition relationship based on client poaching, 
we are facing a case of unfair competition.     
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VIII - Damages and civil liability 
It is known that one of the triggers of civil liability is the misuse of 
right, as set forth in article 187 of the Civil Code, transcribed below: 
Article 187. The right holder also commits an illegal act when exercising 
it in clear violation of the limits imposed by its economic and social 
purposes, by good faith, or by morality. 
When commenting the legal provision above, the literature indicates 
30 that the “main ground of the misuse of right is preventing that the law is used 
as a form of oppression, preventing the right holder from using their power with 
a purpose other than the one it is meant for.” 
Accordingly, acknowledging the existence of misuse when the holder 
crosses the limits of their right, the Superior Court of Justice decided as follows: 
“PROCEDURAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAWS. SPECIAL 
APPEAL. LAWSUIT FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS DAMAGES. 
PUBLIC SERVICE CONCESSIONAIRE. 
NON-DEMONSTRATED COURT DISSENSION. ELECTRIC 
POWER SUPPLY. SUSPENSION. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF 
ARTICLES 186 AND 188 OF THE CIVIL CODE. 
DISMISSED. MISUSE OF RIGHT. EVIDENCE OF ILLEGAL ACT 
(ARTICLE 187 OF THE CIVIL CODE). DAMAGES GRANTED. 
JURISTS. THE SPECIAL APPEAL WAS PARTIALLY 
ENTERTAINED AND, IN THIS PART, DISMISSED.” 
(...) 
3. The right holder commits an illegal act when exercising it in clear 
violation of the limits imposed by its economic and social purposes, by 
good faith, or by morality (article 187 of the Civil Code) (...) 
 (Special Appeal 811690/RR – Superior Tribunal de Justiça / STJ -, 
Rapporteur Justice DENISE ARRUDA, FIRST PANEL, judgement on 
5/18/2006, published on the Official Judicial Gazette on 6/19/2006, page 
123). 
Since the competitor tries to take advantage of inexistent exclusivity 
in order to obtain protection for common use signs (generic and descriptive 
trademarks), while trying to extend the effects of their rights, a misuse situation 
would be formed, with the clear intent of preventing the entry of new agents 
in the market (barriers to entry) or increasing the rival’s costs.   This conduct 
may be built on an anticompetitive ratio, with the purpose of preventing the 
                                                     
30 CAVALIERI FILHO, S., Responsabilidade Civil, São Paulo, Saraiva, 2007, page 
143.  
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access to the market to newcomers or of raising difficulties to the operation of 
an efficient competitor company.     In this case, from the private interest point 
of view, the losses caused by the misuse of right must be compensated. 
IX - Unfair competition  
The unfair competition is directly related to the loss caused by the 
illegal client poaching.   Thus, the undue enrichment is related to the civil 
liability in a trade activity-related situation, no matter if there is or not 
competition.  In this case (unfair competition), such practice tends to be 
associated with winning a client by taking parasite-like advantage from 
someone else’s investment in the scope of the relationship among competitors, 
and it may be related to unfair competition practices if it is used for client 
poaching in favor of a certain competitor, to the loss of another.   
Therefore, it is not an exclusionary right, but a provision designed, in 
the same way as the civil liability, to grant a monetary compensation for a loss 
derived from the distortion in the form of winning clients.    The legitimate 
party does not have certain powers inherent to the exclusionary rights, such as 
the ius prohibendi.    In the end, the prohibition of unfair competition is 
equivalent, therefore, to a civil liability rule applied to trade, notably to 
industrial law (and, in several cases, intellectual law).  Its scope of application 
does not allow the simple exclusion of third parties, but only the recovery of 
the investments damaged by the client poaching.   It not the exclusionary right 
that is in question, but a financial compensation for the competition loss.    
Assessing the damage is not a simple task, and it is even more 
complicated in cases of goods produced by the creations of the human spirit.   
These creations may be materialized as creations of backgrounds, shapes and 
designs, on one hand, and literary and artistic works, on the other hand.  Such 
conceptions may be subject to property attribution upon exclusionary rights or 
“legal monopolies” (not be confused with “economic monopolies”), which 
enable the creation of business methods based on rights, notably intellectual 
property rights.   
The so-called new economy is an indication that the production of 
commodities and the industrial manufacture of products (corporeal material 
properties) are becoming less relevant in the so-called information society, in 
face of the technology and innovation markets.31     
The technological property, or commercially valuable property mean 
                                                     
31From these markets, the dynamic competition resulting from intellectual property can 
be inferred. 
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a concrete economic expression with financial value, since the appraiser brings 
a differed sale to current value, i.e., a future sale that has not happened yet, and 
the appraiser has more than fifty mathematic methods available, which can be 
cumulative (they consider the cash flow, the market share, current and future 
sales revenue, marketing investment, market research about the consumer trust 
on the trademark, levels of intellectual protection, etc.). However, this is an 
economic valuation of the (future) purchase decision of the effectively and 
potentially captivated client. 
Among the client captivation and market share conquest actions, in 
addition to investments in research, development and innovation, are the 
investment in advertising. It is known that investments in innovation do not 
mean automatic business success of the product that materializes the respective 
results (e.g., an invention of a process or product).  On the contrary, a 
background creation, for example, a new technology for products or processes, 
does not necessarily lead to the acquisition of new clients.  Accordingly, there 
are several patented technologies, or technologies protected by other exclusive 
rights, that have not generated any kind of commercial success, i.e., 
technologies that are available in the databases of national patent offices (the 
INPI of each country), which have not lead to an impact on the power to attract 
clients for their holders or possible licensees. 
Therefore, the marketing actions have a direct or relevant connection 
with the commercial success of new products and services.  In several sectors, 
advertising is a key element of the business plan.32   The protection to loyalty 
in competition has the purpose of protecting this investment (part of the global 
investment in IPR), avoiding client poaching made with the parasite-like 
benefit from another person’s, the investor's and the entrepreneur’s efforts. 
   In this context, the parasite-like profiting may occur with the 
                                                     
32Sectors such as cosmetics, beverages and automotive, which depend on returns do 
scale, use advertising as a key element of their business methods.   Investments for 
launching a new product and/or trademark are based on strong budgets.   
Notwithstanding that, advertising can be considered a “candidate for barrier to entry”. 
“Advertising is sometimes put forward as a candidate for barrier to entry.” Massive 
advertising is said to create a consumer preference for existing brands that the new 
entrant an overcome only with still more massive advertising.” See POSNER, R., 
Antitrust Law, page 326.   Some authors claim this is not plausible.  In that sense, some 
claim that it would be enough if the newcomer closed deals with retail distributors to 
fix its own trademark.  However, this depends on the level of concentration, both in 
manufacturing and distribution.   It cannot be ignored that the position of products on 
shelves and the advertising of trademarks in the big distribution chains represent a cost 
and are part of the business strategy.  The levels of concentration and the economies of 
scale in the food distribution, in retail, are relevant for the analysis.  
REVISTA DO IBRAC Volume 23 - Número 1 - 2017 
184 
imitation of a competitor’s product, with some comparative advertising acts 
(which, in Brazil, lack specific regulation), and also with advertising by 
association.  But not in all situations; only in those restricted to the scope of 
subjective and objective enforcement of the rule. 
The compensation of the investment is, therefore, financial, not 
monopoly-related. In jurisdictions  where the unfair competition does not exist, 
there is a combination of institutes dedicated to fighting the illegal act, that is, 
the elements protecting the competitor from embarrassments to their rights, 
whether with the repression to undue enrichment, or the enforcement of civil 
liability rules and, sometimes, new categories of IPRs (such as non-original 
data bases).  Both are jointly used to solve disputes. 
The provision granting protection against unfair competition is article 
195 of LPI (Law nº 9,279, of May 14, 2014). From the legal provision, we infer 
that the protection against unfair competition can never work as a perfect 
replacement for the exclusionary right (trademark, patent, design rights, etc.).   
As a necessary consequence, it is not possible to use this institute (protection 
against unfair competition) to “compensate” the lack of “exclusionary rights” 
over industrial property, in any circumstances: whether due to expiration of 
exclusionary rights, or by the business choice for the non-protection (cost, 
impossibility of registration, lack of other requirements for the protection of 
background, shape and signs concepts).   As said before, the purpose of these 
provisions is the financial compensation for the loss, not granting monopoly 
shares that the legislator decided to not grant or extinguish.   For the same 
reason, thus, the means to prove unfair competition acts on one hand, and 
trademark, patent, design or cultivar forgery on the other hand, are different.   
 
A legal action for preventing the use and/or for damages usually 
combines requests of urgent remedies, which depend on prima facie evidence.   
Since there is a chance of error in all human relations and the capture is not 
impossible, it is not also impossible (even though rare) a mistake of the judging 
authority leading to the expelling of an efficient dominant company, of 
newcomers and of potential or actual competitors.  Indirectly, in case of misuse, 
the active agent of the misuse of right may use a legal action as part of a strategy 
with the purpose of distorting commercial relationships, and possibly operate 
as an instrument to concentrate the market, excluding efficient competitors.   In 
this case, depending on the size of the wrongly-excluded company (for 
example, a small business), no individual compensation is possible.  Certainly, 
an isolated abusive exclusion may not be relevant for the most of the antitrust 
literature, but if this exclusion is a result, for example, of an organized practice 
(horizontal or by a monopoly), this exclusion may affect the whole market and 
it will be in the scope of enforcement of competition rules.    Anyhow, the 
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protection of the public interest is possible upon enforcement of competition 
rules.  
X - Violation of competition rules  
i. Presentation  
Holding intellectual property rights, since it leads to the grant of 
temporary exclusive rights33 by the Government, causes controversies in 
literature, notably considering the rules about government intervention in 
market economies.3435    In said economies, the role of competition rules is 
mainly ensuring a competitive environment for business relationships, in order 
to ensure a larger number of products and services at lower price, to the benefit 
of consumers.  Consumers are in the center of the system.   Thus, no 
exclusionary rights can be justified without a gain for consumers.      Therefore, 
the main focus is in the freedom of choice considering the variety of supply and 
the interaction among suppliers and purchasers, purging barriers to entry of new 
competitors and exclusionary conducts.   For all that, imposing barriers to entry, 
in any way, is always a point of concern in term of competition policies.  More 
than that, it is the rear sight of competition policies.    In that sense, there is no 
antagonism regarding the intellectual property rights, but a concern with the 
misuse of any and all assets to impose barriers to entry, having a potential to 
create deformations in the market structure, or to keep the concentration levels 
inefficiently elevated. 
As mentioned before, articulating competition rules and exclusionary 
                                                     
33 BOTANA AGRA, Manuel, Las licencias exclusivas sobre obtenciones vegetales no 
son necesariamente inconciliables con el artículo 85-1 del tratado de la CEE, ADI, 
(8)1982, p. 427-430. BOTANA AGRA, M., Las normas sustantivas del A-ADPIC 
(TRIPS) sobre los derechos de propiedad intelectual, ADI, 16(1994-95), p. 109-162.  
34 HERNÁNDEZ RODRÍGUEZ, F., Precios predatorios y derecho Antitrust, Madrid, 
Marcial Pons, 1997, p. 19-20: “No se debe caer en el error de confundir la economía 
de mercado, tal y como se entiende en la actualidad, con la economía liberal típica del 
siglo XIX a pesar de que ésta sea, en gran medida, tributaria de aquélla. La economía 
de mercado constituye un orden económico, un principio organizado que es 
susceptible de múltiples variaciones y en el que tienen cabida desde el liberalismo más 
radical hasta la economía social de mercado. Lo que distingue y caracteriza la 
economía de mercado es la orientación de todos los procesos económicos hacia el 
consumo, que es el encargado de transmitir a los productores las directrices a seguir 
mediante valoraciones expresadas en los precios”. 
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rights, born from the grant of intellectual property, is a difficult task.  
Competition authorities still have not defined objective criteria in the Brazilian 
Antitrust System.  There are no guidelines in this matter.    The difficulty exists 
for not implying an impact between intellectual property and competition rules 
(alleged “congenital” incompatibility of purposes that does not exist, for part of 
the jurists), but for enabling the exercise of “intelectual property powers” that 
allow the holder to impose, in a legitimate way, exclusionary rights (in addition 
to the positive right to use, the ius prohibendi, or negative right of exclusion 36 
of third parties37), which can, in reality, mean a inefficient  barrier to entry.  
However, in principle, it is not a “free” barrier.  On the contrary, there 
must be a compensation to the State, a consideration (to be paid by the right 
holder) for the social environment that created it (such legal monopoly that 
actually operates as a barrier to entry) and, in general, granted it specifically to 
the IPRs holder, which must meet certain requirements in order to obtain said 
“special powers” inherent to said intellectual property rights.  It becomes even 
more clear considering the intellectual property roles.   
In case of success in the market, the exclusivity will ensure to the 
holder the temporary market power to cause scarcity and, therefore, an 
abnormal profit.   In principle, it is considered that the use of said exclusive 
rights may be used for promoting innovation, since it transforms free 
information, data, knowledge, etc., in a technology-carrying asset 38(or, at the 
end, an intellectual property asset 39). The power to exclude acts of 
reproduction or copies by imitation (but not by surmounting) generates a right 
to cause scarcity and, thus, we repeat, an abnormal price.  This phenomenon is 
a result of the consumption rivalry caused by artificial scarcity.  The attraction 
                                                     
36GRAU-KUNTZ, Karin. Propriedade Industrial e Direito da Concorrência: 
Caminhos para a Promoção e Desenvolvimento do Interesse Público, International 
Conference for the 200 years of Intellectual Property in Brazil, 5th Panel, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (of the Federative Republic of Brazil), Brasília, 2009. Agreeing with 
this author, we understand that this power can be a bunker for protection against 
competitors. Let us see: “the exclusive right can be used by its holder as a ‘shield’ 
against competition. This ‘shield effect’, as we know, is not a mere consequence of the 
exclusive right, but an essential mechanism of exclusivity. So, we must ask, up to what 
extent can the holder enforce this ‘shield’ mechanism in the market?” 
37The ius prohibendi is a characteristic of the exclusionary rights. Accordingly, the ius 
prohibendi is not applicable in other situations set forth in the legislations for purposes 
of protecting the investment by protecting the loyal competition, which requires a 
financial compensation, the same way as the civil liability.  
38GRAU-KUNTZ, Karin, loc. cit. 
39ASSAFIM, J.M.L., A transferência de tecnologia no Brasil: aspectos contratuais e 
concorrenciais de propriedade industrial, Rio de Janeiro, Lumen Juris, 2005.  
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power of investments that IPRs may promote comes from there. The attraction 
of new entrepreneurs caused by the exclusive rights stimulates not only the 
static competition of products for the price, but also the dynamic competition 
for technologies and, more than that, the race for innovation (therefore, in 
addition to the static product markets, the dynamic technology market gain 
relevance, notably the innovation market).  Such technologies, on their turn, 
must be associated with names with trademark function so they can be 
identified by the respective consumers.     
Thus, the coexistence of new and competitor technologies becomes 
possible due to several factors, but mainly the “incentive” or “reward” of the 
grant of an exclusive right.   In the high technologies market, it is important the 
existence of IPRs and the economy of scale (network externalities).   Therefore, 
the entrepreneur activity is stimulated this way. The exclusive tends to generate 
certain positive externalities by inducing the dynamic competition (more and 
better products and services at lower prices), with incentive to the creation of 
new technologies, thus improving the so-called innovation market.   The first 
player to come has an advantage.    The impossibility of competition by 
imitation claims for the investment in innovation by the players and, thus, the 
creation of new technologies with the eventual dynamic competition.   Of 
course, distortions are always possible to occur.      But, distortions are 
exceptions if the control exists.  This pro-competitive phenomenon is only 
possible in case there are policies for banishing misuse, i.e., fighting abusive 
barriers to entry that can eliminate or harm the competition by surmounting by 
efficient competitors, which is unjustifiable from the entrepreneurship 
perspective (those barriers that inhibit entrepreneur activities)40 and worse, 
vectors for the elimination of competitors with anti-entrepreneurship 
restrictions41.    The misuse case, then, consists of a deviation and, as such, 
must be fought by public policies on grounds of public interest. 
                                                     
40However, some authors consider that in some sectors where the innovation activities 
and lobbies operating in favor of stronger protections are economically dominated by 
mega-corporations, the social and economic results can be different. The literature 
mention, for example, in case of computer software, the political-legislative choice of 
certain countries of not protecting such conception under patents as an element of safety 
for local developers. With that, local developer could become entrepreneurs in their 
market of origin, being sure that they would not be sued by an international corporation 
for the way they “wrote” their source code, or for a certain feature embedded in the 
solution.  
41See Administrative Process CADE (Brazilian antitrust authority) nº 
08012.0026732007-51. Complaint filed by Associação Nacional das Fabricantes de 
Autopeças – ANFAPE against the assemblers FIAT, Volkswagen and Ford.  
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ii. Trademarks and Free Competition Law  
ii.1. Problems derived from the exercise of trademark rights that affect free 
competition   
The trademark law protection is only applicable (or legally 
attributable) to a word or other sign that identify the designated good or service, 
distinguishing it from those coming from other manufacturers or suppliers42.   
The sign’s distinctive power is the mater cell of the trademark law protection.  
Without this distinguishing character, we cannot talk about exclusionary right.  
The trademark applications filed by businesspersons and individuals in general 
before the relevant authority regarding signs without distinctive character must 
be denied, under penalty of appropriation of public domain.   Alternatively, 
these signs may be registered trademarks, with reservations for being common 
use signs (use restriction that in Brazilian administrative practice used to occurs 
upon registration of a disclaimer in the trademark’s registration certificate).      
Unfortunately, there are system where the protection to common use 
signs has been treated with certain leniency by authorities, which leads to 
different decisions for the same situation, and poses serious risks of negative 
externality.  Therefore, it is possible that the same sign devoid of distinctive 
power, in the same class, is subject to a series of applications and registrations, 
by different holders, with and without reservations. 
The lack of distinctive power is harmful to the IP system, since the 
attributed sign (to which one intends to attribute the trademark role)43 is 
‘incapable’ of transmitting the necessary information to the consumer’s 
research.  If it was distinctive, the trademark would allow the consumer to 
identify the good or service (generated by prior consumer experiences with the 
relevant good or product, by the consumer or third parties).  The lack of 
distinctiveness prevents the recovery of this kind of information used in the 
consumer’s search (consumption research), making the research more 
expensive and, all things considered, the expropriation of the “standard” word 
allows the holder - the appropriation agent - to be able to define higher levels 
                                                     
42 Trademark protection is available only for a word or other signifier that identifies the 
underlying good or service and distinguisher it from that of other producers. LANDES, 
W.M. & POSNER, R. A., The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law, 
Cambridge / Massachusetts / London, Harvard Press, 2003,  pages. 187-188. 
43 Ibidem. “Lack of distinctiveness would make the mark incapable of identifying the 
good and recalling to a consumer the information (generated by previous experience 
with the good by him or other consumer) that lowers his search costs and enables the 
producer to charge a higher price.” 
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of prices.44 
The literature indicates, for the same reason, that no manufacturer or 
seller would like to take a free ride in a non-distinctive sign.  There is no social 
and economic justification for this option.   The incentive for taking a free ride 
would depend on the difference between the profits generated by the sign with 
trademark role (which presumably would be close to zero in cases of signs 
devoid of distinctive character), and the costs of duplication or reproduction45.  
Therefore, according to the literature, this case would be economically 
unjustified.  
However, LANDES and POSNER46indicate that the 
acknowledgement of these variables, as such, does not imply that the legal 
trademark protection (by exclusionary right) to signs devoid of distinctive 
character is harmless.    A sign that does not distinguish (the trademark 
designation) one product from the other was likely conceived based on 
elements (words, colors, symbols and shapes) that are also used by other 
manufacturers of the product. Therefore, the legal protection of such sign (as a 
trademark) upon an exclusionary right would grant to the relevant holder the 
                                                     
44 Ibidem. 
45 But this does not mean that giving legal protection to non distinctive marks would be 
harmless.  A mark that does not distinguish on brand of a product from another is 
probably created from words, symbols, shapes or colors that are used by other 
producers of the product as well, and so legal protection of the mark would be likely to 
prevent others from using identifiers that they require in order to be able to compete 
effectively. 
46 “We can explore this point formally by expanding our H function for a particular 
producer that 
H=H(T, Y, W, Z),    (10) 
where Z denotes words used in common with other producers, such as “computer,” 
“electrical,” or “heavy,” that is, product rather than band identifiers.    In effect, equation 
(10) redefines W as an index of words for  use as trademarks except those (Z) used in 
common with other producers.    Because the Z terms describe features of the product 
as distinct from features peculiar to each producer’s brand, they tend to be limited in 
number.  The variable Z combines with T to produce information that lowers search 
costs.   Allowing a producer to appropriate a nondistinctive mark would enable him to 
force his competitor to remove Z from their labels, packaging, and product design.  The 
result would be to shift the – H, X curve in Figure 7.2. downward and to lower T and 
raise H for those producers no longer permitted to use Z.  The amount of X they 
produced would fall, shifting the supply curve of X to left.  There would be a  social 
loss because consumers would be paying higher prices for a smaller quantity.  Our 
earlier example of a firm allowed to  use “personal computer”  as its trademark 
illustrates his point.” LANDES, W.M. & POSNER, R. A., The Economic…, cit.      
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right to exclude other efficient competitors from the right to use the identifying 
elements that would be necessary to compete in an effective way47.     
 In Anglo-Saxon systems, the law could provide for an intended 
solution for this kind of problem by ordering Courts to examine the economic 
effects of allowing a specific manufacturer to have exclusive rights to exploit a 
particular trademark.48    However, this solution would transform the entire 
trademark issue in an antitrust issue governed by the rule of reason.   Certainly, 
the social and private costs initially pull this kind of solution49 away in 
jurisdiction based on the Civil Law (notably in the Brazilian case).  
Nevertheless, it is clear that the exercise of some trademark rights is not 
immune to the antitrust analysis, as some people seems to prefer.   On the 
contrary, the intention of appropriation of descriptive signs as a trademark by 
an economic agent, to the loss of the other competitors, denotes the perspective 
of loss derived from the “monopoly’s dead weight”.      
Considering that the adverse allocation effects derived from the 
misuse of trademark rights are, in principle, substantially limited in order to 
increase research costs and consumers’ choice in a narrow class of activity 
(which also justifies the specialty principle, limiting the right to a certain class 
of activities), the poor distribution of resources potential would be smaller in 
                                                     
47 “The law could try to solve this problem by having the courts inquire in every  case 
into the economic effect of allowing a particular producer to have exclusive rights to 
particular mark.  But then a trademark case could be like an antitrust case governed by 
a Rule of Reason.  Such cases are very costly or even to settle, and the only thing that 
makes it worthwhile (both privately and socially) to incur these costs is the large private 
and social costs that some antitrust violations and some mistaken determinations of 
antitrust violations impose.”  LANDES, W.M. & POSNER, R. A., The Economic…, 
cit. 
 “The law could try to solve this problem by having the courts inquire in every  case 
into the economic effect of allowing a particular producer to have exclusive rights to 
particular mark.  But then a trademark case could be like an antitrust case governed by 
a Rule of Reason.  Such cases are very costly or even to settle, and the only thing that 
makes it worthwhile (both privately and socially) to incur these costs is the large private 
and social costs that some antitrust violations and some mistaken determinations of 
antitrust violations impose.” 
 “The law could try to solve this problem by having the courts inquire in every  case 
into the economic effect of allowing a particular producer to have exclusive rights to 
particular mark.  But then a trademark case could be like an antitrust case governed by 
a Rule of Reason.  Such cases are very costly or even to settle, and the only thing that 
makes it worthwhile (both privately and socially) to incur these costs is the large private 
and social costs that some antitrust violations and some mistaken determinations of 
antitrust violations impose.” 
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cases than in most antitrust cases. Consequently, the private participations in 
such restrictions would also be smaller. 
The material difficulty in defining a criterion for the antitrust analysis 
for all situations involving trademarks has been making it hard for precedents 
to appear in antitrust authorities.   However, the trademark legislations bring 
registration prohibitions for signs devoid of distinctive power and they granted 
protection to a limited number of activity classes - which brings the trademark 
registration rules closer to an antitrust rule of prohibition per se.  In other words, 
the intent of appropriating generic and descriptive signs, in order to exclude 
competitors, is illegal. However, the appropriation intent regarding a sign 
devoid of distinctive character by a manufacturer, to the loss of their 
competitors, for not being justifiable from the economic point of view, must be 
subject to antitrust analysis, notably in concentrated markets (but not limited to 
this case).  In this sense, the trademark coexistence or border agreement 
(Abgrenzungvereibarung)50 between competitors is also in the scope of antitrust 
law.   Notwithstanding this, the matters related to the pure imitation (of strong 
signs or signs having distinctive character) tend to not lead to antitrust issues, 
since they would be matters of private interest. 
 XI - Conclusion  
 The trademark right does not grant to its holder powers that are 
immune to antitrust analysis. On the contrary, the exercise of intellectual 
property rights falls into the objective scope of the competition laws.   Even if 
the matters related to ordinary imitation do not have, in principle, the potential 
to affect costs of consumption researches, the intent of appropriating signs 
devoid of distinctive power can lead to the “loss of monopoly’s dead weight” 
if used in cases of abusive exclusions. 
     
1. This appropriation intent of generic and descriptive signs, 
when taken into effect, tends to increase costs of consumption 
research by consumers, since a single supplier takes possession 
of the standard word.   This phenomenon increases rivals’ 
costs, since they must make investments in the pursuit of new 
words to describe the category to consumers, not to mention 
the licensing and litigation costs. 
2. During litigations, the manufacturers or sellers that want to 
exclude efficient competitors, preventing them from using 
generic and descriptive signs required for the effective 
                                                     
50 RIβMANN, cit. Page 147.  
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competition (informing the consumer about consumption 
“alternatives”), tend to justify the exclusionary conduct with 
the investment made on the common use sign.  This argument 
is based on a false premise, i.e., that IPRs protect the 
investment itself.  According to this premise, the relevant 
economic agent would have invested in the descriptive sign 
with trademark role, and competitors would have copied the 
sign to take advantage from the investment.   
3. However, this argument is not correct because intellectual 
property does not protect the investment itself (for e.g., 
marketing investment), notably when the manufacturer decided 
to invest in the sign devoid of distinctive character, and they 
cannot claim that they were unaware of the prior use of the 
common use sign by efficient competitors (whether with the 
use, or by the publication of requirements of previous 
registrations); the use by other competitors in the same market 
is entitled to some level of protection.      This would be a classic 
case of bad faith: being aware of the binding fact at the time of 
the action.  
4. The premise of the previous conclusion (number 3, claimed by 
the trademark applicant regarding a sign devoid of distinctive 
power) would, then, be false, for in said case, the agent could 
not claim being unaware of the fact that the generic and/or 
devoid of descriptive sign was of common use at the time of 
the investment decision.  On the contrary, the generic character 
was the element that motivated the investment. 
5. The literature associates this practice, by analogy, to the act of 
fencing a “real” (material) property.  It would be like admitting, 
in case of disturbance, illegal act or invasion, a situation where 
the invader claims, in their defense during the action for 
repossession, the right of retention over the real property due 
to an alleged improvement (investment) made by the invader 
in a real property they knew belonged to someone else.  The 
situation goes beyond the misuse of right, i.e., it is consistent 
with the characterization of bad faith. 
6. This situation must be purged by the Trademark Board of the 
Brazilian PTO (INPI), which must deny registration 
applications involving signs devoid of distinctive power (or do 
so by using an express use restriction, such as a disclaimer), 
and must also dismiss Administrative Process for Nullity filed 
by holders of trademarks devoid of distinctive power against 
subsequent  registrations filled by competitors that, in a 
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legitimate way, intend to use (not exclude third parties from 
use) these common use signs to compete in the relevant market, 
ensuring alternatives, more products and services, and fewer 
research cost for consumers.    
7. The stratagem tends to be more serious when the manufacturer 
uses more than one action, with different grounds and causes 
of action, frivolous or inexistent IPRs (patent application 
without examination, trademark application reproducing 
competitor’s priority, etc., with a type of tool box) in order to 
exclude a single product, with abuse of petitioning right and 
with anticompetition effect. 
8. When a competitor intends to expropriate proprietary rights 
from other efficient competitors, thus subtracting from these 
competitors the powers granted to the public with the same 
conduct (expropriation of public domains), it tends to create a 
loss to the market, which by the increase of concentration, 
tends to impose to purchasers and consumers the scarcity and 
cost of monopoly’s ‘dead weight’.   Best case scenario, the 
rival’s costs will increase  
9. If the player seeks to exercise a right that, according to the 
legislation, said player does not have or should not have, and 
does so with the sole purpose of excluding efficient 
competitors or increasing rival’s costs, this situation must be 
subject to antitrust analysis with the purpose of purging the 
anti-entrepreneurship distortion.     Therefore, the situation 
involving signs devoid of distinctive power is identical to those 
in antitrust precedents, as the one in the Box 3 Vídeo/Shop 
Tour case. 
10. If the use trademark and other IPRs deserve protection of the 
IP system and the jurisdiction in order to provide dynamic 
competition, the misuse of IPRs may lead to anti-competition 
restrictions.  Notwithstanding, this phenomenon is different 
from others existing in the commodities markets.   
11. Therefore, the analysis of this phenomenon (misuse of 
intellectual property rights) is inconsistent with the static 
analysis of price competition.   The antitrust analysis criterion 
for IPR misuse situations must be subject to the dynamic 
analysis.   In this way, according to the widely-accepted 
literature, the policymaker must develop criteria for this new 
analysis in order to face the challenges of the new economy.  
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